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A PROPOSAL FOR EXTENSION OF 
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ACT TO INDIAN-OWNED 
BUSINESSES ON RESERVATIONS 
· In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act1 to protect the health of American workers. The Act is a 
general statute2 that does not explicitly state that it applies to 
Indian-owned businesses on reservations. In Donovan v. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribal Farm3 the Ninth Circuit held that the Act ap-
plies to Indian businesses, but in Donovan v. Navajo Forest 
Products Industries"' the Tenth Circuit held that the Act does 
not apply to tribal businesses. 
In Coeur d'Alene, the Ninth Circuit decided that the Act cov-
ers a commercial farm6 the Indians operate on their 350,000-acre 
reservation in northern Idaho. The court based its decision on 
the Tuscarora rule, a common-but improper-interpretation of 
dictum in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Na-
tion, 6 suggesting that general statutes apply to Indian tribes. 
The Ninth Circuit, without analyzing the basis of the Tuscarora 
rule, declared that it would follow the rule as it had done in 
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
678 (1982)). 
Section 655 gives the Secretary of Labor the authority to promulgate occupational 
safety and health standards, and § 654 imposes a duty upon employers to comply with 
them. Section 657 authorizes the Secretary to inspect workplaces to assure compliance 
with the standards. If an inspection reveals a violation, § 658 allows the Secretary to 
issue the employer a citation, and § 666 authorizes the Secretary to assess a penalty 
against him. Under § 659(c), an employer who contests a citation can have a hearing 
before the Occupational Safety and Health Commission. Section 660 authorizes judicial 
review of the result of such a hearing. 
2. For the purposes of this Note, a general statute is an act that appears on its face 
applicable to all Americans, yet does not specifically purport to cover Indians, reserva-
tions, or tribes. 
3. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
4. 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982). 
5. In 1978 a compliance officer from the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion (OSHA) inspected two of the farm's grain elevators, issued citations for 21 alleged 
violations, and proposed a penalty of $185. 751 F.2d at 1114. 
6. 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960); see infra notes 88-125 and accompanying text. 
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interpreting broad federal criminal statutes,7 federal tax laws,8 
and the Eagle Protection Act.9 The court recognized three ex-
ceptions to the Tuscarora rule, but concluded that the Act did 
not fall within any of them. The only exception pertinent to the 
current analysis is "aspects of tribal self-government."10 The 
Ninth Circuit gave a very limited reading to this exception, con-
cluding that it preserved tribal control of "purely intramural 
matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance 
rules, and domestic relations," but that "the right to conduct 
commercial enterprises free of federal regulation" was not "an 
aspect of tribal self-government."11 The court declined to ac-
knowledge a tribe's power to make health and safety laws, or to 
exclude outsiders, such as federal inspectors, as attributes of 
self-government. 
While the Ninth Circuit has unblinkingly accepted the Tusca-
rora rule, the Tenth Circuit has been more circumspect. In Don-
ovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries the Tenth Circuit 
held that the Navajo Treaty's guarantee of tribal sovereignty ne-
gates any suggestion that the Act implicitly authorizes federal 
officials to inspect Navajo Forest Products lndustries.12 Article 
II of the ·treaty between the United States and the Navajos13 
7. See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1111 (1981); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1975). 
8. See Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that federal excise taxes applied to the operation of a tribal sawmill 
because neither the tax code, nor its regulations, nor its legislative history granted an 
exemption for tribes), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 
646 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that federal income taxes applied to Indians who earned 
income from logging on a reservation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). 
9. United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 
(1980) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1982)); see infra notes 118-23 and accompanying 
text. 
10. 751 F.2d at 1116-17. 
"Treaty rights" is the Ninth Circuit's second exception to the Tuscarora rule. The 
exception states that a statute cannot implicitly abrogate a treaty right. The exception 
does not apply in this case because the Coeur d'Alene Tribe does not have a treaty with 
the United States. Id. at 1117-18. 
"Other indications" is the Ninth Circuit's third exception to the Tuscarora rule. Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, this exception is inapplicable to Coeur d'Alene Tribal 
Farm because neither the legislative history of the Act, nor its surrounding circum-
stances, indicate that Congress intended to exclude tribes from the Act's coverage. Id. at 
1118. 
11. Id. at 1116. 
12. The Navajo Tribe owns Navajo Forest Products Industries (NFPI) and operates 
it on the Navajo Reservation in Navajo, New Mexico. After inspection of NFPI, the Sec-
retary of Labor cited it for one serious and 53 other-than-serious violations. The pro-
posed penalty was $4,040. 692 F.2d at 710. 
13. Treaty of Fort Sumner, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667 (Navajo). The treaty states in 
pertinent part: 
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gives the Indians the power to exclude people from their land. 
The Tenth Circuit declared that the treaty prevents federal per-
sonnel from entering the reservation absent specific government 
authorization. 14 According to the court's interpretation of the 
importance the Supreme Court has given to a tribe's power to 
exclude outsiders, 111 such power is an inherent sovereign right, 
existing despite the absence of a treaty recognizing such a 
right. 18 This reasoning suggests that, given jurisdiction, the 
Tenth Circuit would rule that the Act does not apply to the 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe either, despite that tribe's lack of a treaty 
right to exclude outsiders.17 
Resolution of the question of whether the Act applies to In-
dian businesses is important because of the growth of tribal en-
terprises in a variety of areas such as agribusiness, 18 logging, 19 
[T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein so authorized to 
do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employes of the government, or 
of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in dis-
charge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be 
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this 
article. 
Id. at 668. 
14. 692 F.2d at 712. 
15. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982); infra note 35. 
16. 692 F.2d at 712-13. 
In 1871 Congress stopped making treaties with the Indians. A major reason for this 
new policy was that some government officials believed tribes were not sovereigns, and 
therefore lacked authority to negotiate treaties with the United States. The federal gov-
ernment, however, continued to make agreements with Indians that were similar to trea-
ties. F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 105-08 (1982 ed.). 
Today there is little difference between government recognition of a tribe's sovereign 
right to land by "treaty, stipulation, Act of Congress, or Executive order." Antoine v. 
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203-04 (1975). 
17. Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit has attempted to read narrowly the holding of 
Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus. to fit within its "treaty rights" exception to 
Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). See 751 F.2d at 
1117 (stressing the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the Navajo's treaty right to exclude 
outsiders). 
18. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has collected statistics on agribusiness: 
The Gila River Indian Community in Arizona ... has 63,000 acres of irrigated 
farm land, which averages about $17 million in annual gross sales . . . . The 
Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine used $2.1 million dollars from a land claims set-
tlement to purchase a 5,800-acre blueberry farm. In the three years the tribe has 
owned the land, it has harvested a $4.3 million dollar return from the berries 
sold . . . . The Colorado River Indian Tribes in Arizona operate a 6,200-acre 
farm enterprise which grosses about $3 million annual income. Crops include 
cotton, alfalfa, hay and grain. 
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INDIANS 40-42 (1984). 
19. For example, the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa Indians in Wisconsin has 
a forest products business. Id. at 40. 
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and oil,and gas production.20 Although tribal businesses are not 
the only businesses on reservations/11 this Note considers the ju-
risdiction of the Act over Indian-owned businesses only, whether 
owned by tribes or individual Indians. 
This Note argues that the Act does not apply to Indian busi-
nesses because it does not specifically mention them. While sen-
sitive to the desirability of providing certain kinds of federal 
protections to all Americans, this Note takes the position that 
the sovereignty of Indian tribes should not be abrogable except 
by considered and express congressional action. Concluding 
nonetheless that the workplace protection the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act provides should be extended to Indians 
on reservations, the Note proposes amendment of the Act: to ex-
tend its protection; to permit tribal enforcement; and to author-
ize the federal government to help financially troubled Indian 
businesses pay for the costs of compliance. Part I describes the 
20. 
[The Comanche Tribe of Oklahoma] formed the Comanche Energy Resource 
Company (CERCO), an independent oil and gas producing company owned by 
tribal members. 
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe of New Mexico was the first tribe to produce its own 
oil and gas. In 1981 the tribe bought out the interests of a commercial oil com-
pany on the reservation, formed the Jicarilla Energy Company and began to op-
erate and manage its own developed oil and gas properties on tribal lands . . . . 
Id. at 41-42. 
21. In response to the desires of Indians and the Reagan administration for economic 
self-sufficiency on reservations, as well as to the interest of private companies in the coal, 
uranium, gas, oil, and timber on Indian land, private businesses have started enterprises 
on reservations such as joint ventures with tribes and other nonlease agreements. Presi-
dent Reagan has expressed his administration's desire for reservation economic develop-
ment by stating: 
[B]oth the Indian tribes and the nation stand to gain from the prudent develop-
ment and management of the vast coal, oil, gas, uranium and other resources 
found on Indian lands. As already demonstrated by a number of tribes, these 
resources can become the foundation for economic development on many reser-
vations .... 
President's American Indian Policy Statement, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98, 100-01 
(Jan. 24, 1983). 
President Reagan, in accordance with his Indian policy, created a Presidential Com-
mission on Indian Reservation Economies to "advise the President both on steps to 
lessen tribal dependence on federal monies and programs, and ways to strengthen pri-
vate sector investments on the reservations." BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 18, 
at 33. The government is also encouraging Indian economic self-sufficiency through stat-
utes such as the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-08 (1982), 
which gives tribes new flexibility in developing and selling their mineral resources. 
For a discussion of a variety of business arrangements for mineral development on 
reservations, see Note, Non-Lease Agreements Available for Indian Mineral Develop-
ment, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195, 199-200 (1984) (explaining the effect of the Indian Min-
eral Development Act of 1982 on tribal development of mineral resources). 
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historical relationship of Indians to the United States. Part II 
explains the two conflicting views on whether general federal 
statutes implicitly apply to Indian tribes. Interpreting the Act in 
light of the proper rule, Part II concludes that the Act does not 
apply to Indian businesses on reservations. Part III argues that 
Indians on reservations nevertheless need the Act's protection, 
and should receive it through congressional amendment. Part III 
stresses that Congress should respect Indian sovereignty by 
soliciting Indian ideas about the nature of the amendment, and 
by granting the Act's enforcement power to the tribes 
themselves. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIANS AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
Indians have a peculiar relationship with the United States.22 
Tribes possess attributes of autonomy,23 as well as of depen-
dency.24 The inevitable tension between these two attributes has 
resulted in an inherent instability in the trust relationship26 that 
circumscribes the role of the federal government towards Indi-
ans. Properly interpreted, the federal-Indian trust relationship 
places its highest value on Indian sovereignty. 
A. Indian Sovereignty 
One of the judiciary's earliest recognitions of Indian sover-
eignty was the Supreme Court's declaration in Worcester v. 
Georgia26 that tribes are "distinct, independent political commu-
22. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), in which the Court 
stated: 
[Indian tribes] were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-indepen-
dent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as 
nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate 
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus 
far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits 
they reside. 
Id. at 381-82. 
24. See, e.g., Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1910) ("It is thoroughly estab-
lished that Congress has plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal relations, 
and full power to legislate concerning their tribal property. The guardianship arises from 
their condition of tutelage or dependency .... "). 
25. See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text. 
26. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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nities."27 The reserved rights doctrine's28 explanation of treaties 
and Indian sovereignty helps to clarify the nature of such sover-
eignty. The doctrine declares that treaties "[are] not a grant of 
rights to the Indians, hut a grant of rights from them-a reser-
vation of those not granted. "29 
From the 1960's to the present, the federal government has 
favored Indian sovereignty. so The government's current Indian 
policy "stresses the right of Indians and tribes to decide whether 
they will maintain their tribal government and culture and to 
what degree they will assimilate into non-Indian society."81 The 
Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act,82 
which authorizes tribes to administer many federal programs for 
their people, enacts this policy of support for Indian autonomy 
into law.88 Other examples of present-day Indian sovereignty in-
clude tribal legislative power,84 tribal authority to exclude out-
siders from reservations,85 and tribal maintenance of autono-
mous criminal justice systems.88 In light of the government's 
27. Id. at 559. 
28. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
29. Id. 
30. See, e.g., Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 
1181, 1190-92 (1983). 
President Reagan has expressed his Administration's Indian policy by stating, "This 
Administration intends to restore tribal governments to their rightful place among the 
governments of this nation and to enable tribal governments, along with state and local 
governments, to resume control over their own affairs." President's American Indian Pol-
icy Statement, supra note 21, at 101. 
31. Note, supra note 30, at 1181 n.1. 
32. 25 u.s.c. §§ 450-450n (1982). 
33. In the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, Congress 
recognized 
the obligation of the United States to respond to the strong expression of the 
Indian people for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation 
in the direction of educational as well as other federal services to Indian commu-
nities so as to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of 
those communities. 
Id. § 450a(a). 
34. "Tribes have the power to make substantive criminal and civil laws in internal 
matters." F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 248. 
35. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) ("[T]he dissent cor-
rectly notes that a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians 
from Indian lands .... "); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 
1975) ("[I]ntrinsic in the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is the power to exclude trespass-
ers from the reservation."). 
36. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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historical vacillation in Indian policy, 37 however, the current 
self-determination policy may not be permanent.38 
Despite the government's many changes in Indian policy, the 
importance of tribal sovereignty has generally guided judicial in-
terpretation of Indian rights. The courts have developed canons 
of construction to secure the protection of tribal sovereignty. Ca-
nons of treaty construction39 state, "[A]mbiguous expressions 
must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned; In-
dian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves 
would have understood them; and Indian treaties must be liber-
ally construed in favor of the Indians."40Another canon of con-
struction states that statutes abrogating treaty rights are to be 
narrowly construed. 41 The rights of Indians secured in treaties 
are usually those of self-government.•2 Hence, judicial respect 
for treaty rights implicitly recognizes the government's responsi-
bility to protect sovereignty. For example, in Menominee Tribe 
37. From approximately 1787 to 1871, the government sought to keep Indians on res-
ervations and convince them to accept non-Indian culture. By 1871, however, the govern-
ment had decided to assimilate Indians into white culture and force them to become 
land-owning farmers. Note, supra note 30, at 1197. 
In 1934, as a reaction against the assimilation policy, Congress passed the Indian Reor-
ganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 461-479 (1982)). The statute encouraged Indian economic development on reserva-
tions, and gave tribal governments a chance to reorganize themselves by adopting consti-
tutions and bylaws. 
In the 1950's the government again changed its method of treating Indians and 
adopted the termination policy. Congressional passage of individual termination acts 
ended federal recognition of many tribes, caused the sale of some of their former reserva-
tions, and thereby forced their members to relocate. Note, supra note 30, at 1186-89. 
In the 1960's, in reaction to the termination policy's disastrous economic and cultural 
effects on Indians, the government again reversed its position and adopted its current 
policy of favoring Indian self-determination. Id. at 1190-92. 
38. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of 
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 983 (1981) ("[H]istory 
offers no assurance that Indian autonomy will continue to be protected."). 
39. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abroga-
tion: "As Long as the Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Lqng a 
Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975). 
40. Id. at 617 (footnotes omitted). 
41. Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 
138, 160 (1934) (holding that a treaty did not prohibit the improvement of a stream so 
that it could transport timber products; stating that "the intention to abrogate or modify 
a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress."); United States v. 43 Gallons of 
Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883) (holding that a treaty barred the introduction and sale 
of liquor in certain Indian country; stating that "[t]he laws of Congress are always to be 
construed so as to conform to the provisions of a treaty, if it be possible to do so without 
violence to their language."); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 39, at 602 ("Indian 
treaty rights should be abrogated only by express legislative action stating both the spe-
cific promises about to be broken and the intent of Congress to break them."). 
42. United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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of Indians v. United States,43 the Supreme Court held that a 
termination statute did not deprive the Menominee Tribe of 
their treaty rights to hunt and fish because the statute did not 
expressly abrogate them. The rights to hunt and fish were part 
of the Indians' right to maintain their traditional way of life on a 
reservation.•• 
In resolving questions other than treaty construction, such as 
the extent of the jurisdiction of tribal courts,0 the judiciary has 
generally expressed its respect for Indian sovereignty. Preserva-
tion of this principle of respect for sovereignty remains essential 
to fair dealing with Indians, and should continue to inform judi-
cial opinion on the applicability to Indians of federal statutes. 
There are at least two compelling policy reasons for the judici-
ary's respect for Indian sovereignty, and for the current position 
of the other two branches of government favoring it. The first 
reason is that the maintenance of tribal autonomy promotes cul-
tural pluralism, an important American value."6 Many Indian 
cultural beliefs make it impossible for Indian culture to survive 
apart from the tribe in America's capitalistic society. For exam-
ple, Indians value their role as members of tribal communities 
more than their existence as individuals. 47 Also, Indians believe 
43. 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
44. Id. at 406. 
45. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that a non-Indian store owner 
could sue Indians in tribal, but not state court, for debt collection; stating that "[t]he 
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over 
their reservations."); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 
F.2d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding that tribal court had jurisdiction to try Indians for 
adultery, and that the tribe had the authority to tsx Indians for the right to graze stock 
on reservation land; stating that "[i]t would seem clear that the Constitution, as con-
strued by the Supreme Court ... recognizes the existence of Indian tribes as quasi sov-
ereign entities possessing all the inherent rights of sovereignty excepting where restric-
tions have been placed thereon by the United States itself."). 
46. The search for cultural freedom, especially in the area of religion, led diverse 
groups of people to found America and to help it grow. Clinton, supra note 38, at 1060. 
The Constitution supports cultural pluralism by protecting rights such as freedom of 
religion, speech, and association. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. For example, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized the importance of cultural 
pluralism in holding that the Amish did not violate Wisconsin's compulsory school at-
tendance law by forbidding their children, in accordance with Amish religious beliefs, to 
attend high school. In striking down the state law, the Court noted that it had presented 
"a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they 
exist today," and condemned as evil the likely result of such legislation-that the Amish 
"must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to 
migrate to some other and more tolerant region." Id. at 218 (emphasis added, footnote 
omitted). 
47. Clinton, supra note 38, at 1023 ("Indian culture is built around a closely inte-
grated tribal society and spiritual world, and the Indian derives identity from his role 
and relationship within that society and spiritual world.") (footnote omitted). 
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that land is not "property" to be held for personal gain, but 
something that exists for the good of the community."8 Congress 
has enacted laws, such as the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act,"9 to protect Indian cultural values. In accordance with 
America's history of cultural pluralism, and out of respect for 
the value of Indian culture for its own sake, the United States 
should foster tribal independence. Apart from pure cultural en-
richment, a benefit to the country of autonomous tribes is that 
they provide mainstream American society with a benchmark 
against which to test its own values. 110 
A second policy reason for the government to protect Indian 
sovereignty is for belated, if slight, compensation for the dimin-
ishment of their sovereignty that has occurred from the time of 
the European discovery of North America. Through conquest, or 
treaties made under coercive conditions in a language unfamiliar 
to Indians,111 tribes lost much of their land and autonomy. Even 
the sovereign rights the federal government guaranteed tribes in 
treaties have not always been respected.112 The government's pol-
icies of trying to force Indians to assimilate into white culture, 
and later terminating several tribes,118 are other examples of fed-
eral encroachments upon tribal independence. To prevent fur-
ther abuses of Indian sovereignty, and to express regret for past 
wrongs against tribes, the government should foster Indian 
autonomy. 
B. Federal Authority Over Indians 
Over the years, the courts have interpreted "an amalgam of 
the several specific constitutional provisions"11" to give Congress 
plenary power over Indians. 1111 The Constitution explicitly refers 
48. Id. at 1024-25. 
49. 42 u.s.c. § 1996 (1982). 
50. Clinton, supra note 38, at 1063 (noting Americans have recently begun to appre-
ciate the Indian value of protection of the environment). 
51. See Note, The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction: A Proposal 
for Codification, 17 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 681, 682 (1984). 
52. F. CoHEN, supra note 16, at 64. 
53. See supra note 37. 
54. F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 211. 
55. But see Note, Constitutional Law: Congressional Plenary Power Over Indian Af-
fairs-A Doctrine Rooted In Prejudice, 10 AM. IND. L. REv. 117, 119 (1982) ("A search 
for the source of plenary power essentially establishes that the Court's interpretation of 
Indian conditions from a prejudicial point of view dictated the Court's discriminatory 
response: Indians, being a race inferior to white Americans, need pro~ction and pupil• 
age. And there being the obligation, there is the power."). 
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to Indians only three times. The commerce clause states that 
Congress can regulate trade with the Indian tribes,56 and article 
P 7 and the fourteenth amendment118 exempt Indians from taxa-
tion.69 Courts have interpreted the treaty clause,60 the property 
clause,61 the necessary and proper clause,62 and the supremacy 
clause63 as other sources of federal power over Indian affairs.64 
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,66 the Supreme Court recognized the 
power of the government over Indians by stating that "[p ]lenary 
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exer-
cised by Congress from the beginning."66 The Court held that 
Congress could unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties. 
C. The Federal-Indian Trust Relationship 
Although Congress has plenary authority over Indians, due re-
spect for Indian sovereignty often has dissuaded Congress from 
exercising such authority.67 In addition, the trust relationship 
that Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia68 and Worcester v. Georgia69 requires that Congress ex-
ercise its power in accordance with the "best interests" of the 
Indians. In Cherokee Nation, the Chief Justice declared that In-
dians "look to our government for protection," and described 
the relationship of the Indians to the United States as "[t]hat of 
a ward to his guardian."7° Chief Justice Marshall did not elabo-
rate upon the meaning of that relationship. In Worcester, Mar-
shall again recognized the trust relationship in concluding that 
56. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
57. Id. § 2, cl. 3. 
58. Id. amend. XIV,§ 2. 
59. See also Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 39, at 614 n.66 (stating that the Con-
stitution mentions Indians only three times, but those references implicitly give Congress 
the power to regulate Indians). 
60. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
61. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
62. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
63. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
64. F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 207-12. 
65. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
66, Id. at 565; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978) ("It is true 
that in the exercise of the powers of self-government, as in all other matters, the Navajo 
Tribe, like all Indian tribes, remains subject to ultimate federal control."). 
67. See, e.g, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) (exempting Indian tribes from the coverage 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
68. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
69. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
70. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
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treaties were contracts of mutual obligations. 71 The federal gov-
ernment's trust obligation stems from America's promises to de-
fend Indians and their autonomy.72 Some of America's early 
promises became legally binding in treaties, while others remain 
simply moral obligations.73 
Two conflicting interpretations of the "best interests" of Indi-
ans are possible. Under one view, the federal government should 
treat Indians as dependent peoples who need the United States 
to manage their affairs. 74 This view would permit the conclusion 
that any general federal statute should apply fully to Indian res-
ervations. The competing position suggests that t~e government 
ought to perceive Indians as members of tribes whose best inter-
ests are protected by government preservation of tribal sover-
eignty. 711 Under this view, recognition of the continuing impor-
tance of Indian sovereign rights would prevent any federal 
statute, even though benevolent social legislation, from restrict-
ing Indian autonomy in the absence of express congressional 
intent. 
A canon of statutory construction78 adopted by the courts to 
implement the trust relationship illustrates judicial uncer-
tainty77 about which view of Indian "best interests" to adopt. 
The canon interprets federal statutes that explicitly mention In-
dians to favor Indian interests,78 without specifying the nature 
of those interests. Extension of that canon to general federal 
statutes that do not mention Indians would not resolve the ques-
tion of whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act applies 
to Indian businesses. Application of the Act to Indian businesses 
on reservations would benefit Indian workers, yet harm tribes by 
infringing upon their sovereignty.79 
71. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 549-56; Note, supra note 51, at 684 n.14. 
72. Note, supra note 51, at 683-84. 
73. See generally id. at 683-87. 
74. Id. at 687 ("Judicial decisions, for example, have employed the ward-guardian 
model to give Congress great discretion in regulating all aspects of Indian life."). 
75. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
76. For a discussion of the canons of construction courts have used in Indian law, see 
generally Note, supra note 51. 
77. The uncertainty may be a result of the government's historical vacillation in In-
dian policy. See" supra note 37. 
78. United States v. 2,005.32 Acres of Land, 160 F. Supp. 193, 201 (D.S.D. 1958) 
("[S]tatutes concerning the rights of Indians are to be liberally construed in their 
favor."); Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 445, 468 
(1970) ("The cardinal rule of construction for Indian legislation: that all acts are to be · 
interpreted in favor of the Indians."); Note, supra note 51, at 690 ("Legislation favoring 
Indian interests is ... construed broadly, while legislation impairing Indian interests is 
construed narrowly."). 
79. See supra notes 26-53 and accompanying text. 
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For the reasons advanced in section A above, the proper inter-
pretation of the federal-Indian trust relationship would protect 
sovereignty foremost, at least with regard to the applicability of 
statutes that fail to mention Indians.80 The "best interests" of 
Indians may sometimes be advanced by congressional legislation 
aimed at eradicating widespread social evils.81 But because of 
the value Americans place on cultural pluralism,82 and because 
of historical mistreatment of Indians,83 the judiciary must re-
spect tribal sovereignty if it is to protect Indian interests. Apply-
ing general federal statutes to Indian tribes fails to force Con-
gress to weigh the potential benefits of its legislation against the 
certain cost of further undermining Indian autonomy.8" Because 
of the necessary importance of Indian sovereignty, courts should 
adopt a rule of construction that forces Congress to undertake 
this task. 
11. WHETHER THE ACT APPLIES TO INDIAN BUSINESSES ON 
RESERVATIONS 
The Supreme Court has recently recognized in dictum the im-
portance of tribal sovereignty, and indicated that general federal 
statutes not referring to tribes do not govern them. 85 Earlier, 
however, the Court enunciated what some lower courts have 
80. Congress's trust responsibility may require it to pass some protective legislation 
for Indians, though. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
84. See infra notes 101-25 and accompanying text. Although Congress's general In-
dian policy is self-determination, it does not always explicitly consider the effect of gen-
eral statutes on tribal sovereignty. 
Occasionally, though, Congress has weighed the cost of legislation to Indian autonomy. 
For example, in passing the Surface Mining Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 
445 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)), Congress appears to 
have considered the impact the statute would have on tribal sovereignty, and formulated 
the law to minimize interference with Indian autonomy: 
The Secretary is directed to study the question of the regulation of surface min-
ing on Indian lands which will achieve the purpose of this chapter and recognize 
the special jurisdictional status of these lands. In carrying out this study the 
Secretary shall consult with Indian tribes. The study report shall include pro-
posed legislation designed to allow Indian tribes to elect to assume full regula-
tory authority over the administration and enforcement of regulation of surface 
mining of coal on Indian lands. 
Id.§ 1300. 
85. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149, 152 (1982); see infra notes 
127-47. 
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taken to be a contrary position. 88 These courts have mistakenly 
extended the Court's earlier position beyond its intended and 
proper scope. Reconciled with a due respect for Indian sover-
eignty, 87 proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's recent 
dictum compels the conclusion that general federal statutes fail-
ing to mention Indians do not govern them. 
A. The Tuscarora Rule: Applicability of General Federal 
Statutes to Indian Tribes 
In Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,88 
the Supreme Court stated that "it is now well settled by many 
decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying 
to all persons includes Indians and their property interests."89 
The Court enunciated the dictum while deciding that the Fed-
eral Power Act90 allowed the Power Authority of New York, 
under a license from the Federal Power Commission, to take 
Tuscarora Nation land for just compensation. The holding did 
not announce implicit congressional authority over tribal land, 
because section 4(e) of the statute explicitly specified the proce-
dures the Federal Power Commission had to undergo before tak-
ing reservations,91 thus indicating that the statute authorized 
takings of such land.H Although the Tuscarora Nation land was 
not within the statute's technical definition of a reservation,93 
86. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960); see 
infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra notes 26-53 and accompanying text. 
88. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
89. Id. at 116. 
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-82& (1982). The Court referred to the Federal Power Act as "a 
complete and comprehensive plan for the development and improvement of navigation 
and for the development, transmission, and utilization of electric power." 362 U.S. at 
118. 
91. 16 U.S.C. § 797(a) (1982). This section requires the Federal Power Commission, 
before issuing a license for the taking of all or part of a reservation, to find "that the 
license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation 
was created or acquired." Id. 
92. F. CoHF.N, supra note 16, at 284 ("[l]n passing the Federal Power Act Congress 
had specifically dealt with Indian reservation lands and thus clearly intended to apply 
the Act as a whole to Indians and tribes."). 
93. Section 3(2) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 796(2) (1982), defines reserva-
tions as "national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military res-
ervations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, and with-
drawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under public land 
laws." The Tuscarora Nation's land did not fall within the Federal Power Act's defini-
tion of a reservation because the government did not own it. The Tuscarora Nation held 
the land in fee simple. 
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the Court reasonably inferred that congressional intent to au-
thorize takings of reservation land showed intent to authorize 
takings of tribal land generally, regardless of the precise defini-
tion of such land.94 The holding made no more than a reasonable 
construction of already express congressional intent. It was 
hardly remarkable that the Court found that an announced in-
tention to reach Indian reservation land authorized reaching In-
dian nonreservation land. 911 
Some lower courts have erroneously interpreted the dictum in 
Tuscarora to declare that statutes not mentioning tribes, unlike 
the statute at issue in Tuscarora, nevertheless apply to them. 
This reading of the dictum is often called the Tuscarora rule, a 
principle that minimizes the importance of tribal sovereignty. 
Relying on the Tuscarora rule, these courts have found general 
statutes applicable to Indian tribes, even when such applications 
impinge upon tribal sovereignty. 
The Tuscarora dictum correctly read, however, does not state 
that general statutes apply to tribes. The dictum says no more 
than that general laws apply to individual Indians living away 
from their tribes, a subject tangential to the holding that laws 
specifically referring to tribes apply to them.96 This interpreta-
tion is correct for two reasons. First, the dictum expressly relied 
upon three tax cases97 that held general statutes applicable to 
individual Indians separated from their tribes. The Tuscarora 
rule's expansive reading of the original case's dictum is unjusti-
fied because tribal sovereignty was not at issue in the cases on 
A general, nonstatutory definition of a reservation is "land set aside under federal pro-
tection for the residence of tribal Indians, regardless of origin." F. CoHEN, supra note 16, 
at 34. 
94. 362 U.S. at 118. The statute's infringement on tribal sovereignty is the same, 
regardless of the classification of the tribe's land. In either case the government can take 
Indian land. 
95. The Supreme Court's holding that the Tuscarora Nation's land was not within 
the statute's definition of a reservation denied Indians the special protection of§ 797(e), 
which prohibited the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license for the taking of 
a reservation if such taking would interfere with the reservation's purpose. The Court's 
express acknowledgement that Congress had intended to reach reservations, though with 
special protection, justified the conclusion that Congress would also have wanted to 
reach Indian lands that were not technically reservations, and thus not specially pro-
tected by the statute. Because Congress had impliedly recognized that the most pro-
tected Indian lands were reservation lands, by giving them more protection than the land 
of non-Indians, the Court was also justified in assuming that tribal sovereignty would 
receive less protection off a reservation. 
96. See supra note 95. 
97. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943); Superintendent of 
Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 
691 (1931). 
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which the dictum is based. Second, the dictum's assertion that 
the term "persons," in a statute, applies to Indians strongly sug-
gests that those Indians are individuals, not tribes. The Tusca-
rora rule fails to acknowledge that the special status of tribes 
generally excludes them from the statutory definition of 
"persons. "98 
Those courts relying upon the Tuscarora rule have used it in 
one of two ways. One way is to simply cite Tuscarora and thus 
infer that a general statute covers tribes.99 More commonly, 
courts go beyond a mere reference to Tuscarora, but neverthe-
less reach the same result.1°0 These courts take it upon them-
selves to affirmatively decide that Congress intended a particu-
lar policy to override sovereignty, even though such intent is not 
explicit. Examination of these few cases reveals that, except in 
the area of criminal law, they are wrongly decided to the extent 
they rely upon the Tuscarora "rule." 
1. Federal criminal statutes- In accordance with the Tus-
carora rule, courts have usually held that general, federal crimi-
nal statutes give the government jurisdiction over reservation 
Indians.101 The courts have explained their interpretation of the 
effect of federal criminal statutes on reservation Indians either 
by merely citing Tuscarora, 102 or by simply assuming that a fed-
eral criminal statute applies to Indians unless it explicitly ex-
98. Brief for the Respondent Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm at 15-16, Donovan v. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985); F. CoHEN, supra note 16, at 283. 
Cohen states: 
Where retained tribal sovereignty in Indian country is not invaded and no other 
particular Indian right is infringed, individual Indians and their property are 
normally subject to the same federal laws as other persons. Most general federal 
statutes using the term "persons" to define their scope include private groups 
such as corporations and associations; however, an intent to include Indian 
tribes within such definitions must be clearly shown since tribes are "unique 
aggregations" and exercise governmental powers. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
99. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
100. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text. 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982), applies to Indians who 
operate casinos on their reservations, even though the statute does not mention Indians), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); Head v. Hunter, 141 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1944) (decid-
ing that 18 U.S.C. § 72 (1982), a general statute prohibiting the alteration of listed in-
struments "or other writing" to defraud the federal government, implicitly applies to 
reservation Indians). 
For a discussion of the complex scheme of criminal statutes governing Indians, see 
Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional 
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 503 (1976). 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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empt them.103 The decisions holding that general, federal crimi-
nal laws apply to reservation Indians usually do not even discuss 
the possible infringement by such laws of tribes' power to pass 
and enforce their own laws. 10• 
In presuming that general criminal laws apply to tribes, with-
out even mentioning the effect of such laws on sovereignty, 
courts suggest that it is obvious that Congress intends criminal 
laws to apply to everyone. Such a presumption is reasonable be-
cause one of the most basic duties of a government is to protect 
its citizens and their property from harmful criminal activity. 
The interests of efficient and uniform law enforcement validate 
the judicial assumption that criminal law exempts no one from 
its reach. An exemption for tribal Indians might leave some citi-
zens unprotected from criminal activity on reservations,1°11 shock 
the public sensibility, and run counter to fundamental 
fairness. 106 
Because Congress ordinarily gives substantial weight to pro-
tecting all citizens from crime, it is not surprising that a court 
would presume this congressional policy to embody an intent to 
reach Indian reservations.107 In areas other than criminal law, 
courts have struggled to determine Congress's intent with regard 
to Indian sovereignty as shown by their discussions of the effect 
on sovereignty of general laws in areas such as labor organiza-
103. See, e.g., Head v. Hunter, 141 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1944). 
104. But see United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1111 (1981). The court suggested that the jurisdiction of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982), over reservation Indians did not infringe upon 
tribal sovereignty. The Ninth Circuit stated, "But even a general federal law suffices to 
proscribe the large-scale professional gambling involved here; such gambling is neither 
profoundly intramural (the casinos' clientele was largely non-Indian) nor essential to 
self-government." 624 F.2d at 893. 
105. Although Indians tribes can make and enforce their own criminal laws, see 
supra note 34, their scope may not be comprehensive. In United States v. Farris, 624 
F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981), the court expressed a con-
cern for the welfare of non-Indians on reservations. The court, while holding that the 
Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982), applied to reservations, noted 
that the clientele of the reservation's casinos "included many non-Indians and some out-
of-staters." 624 F.2d at 893. 
106. Courts may be reluctant to exclude Indians from the jurisdiction of general 
criminal laws because such an exclusion might deny equal protection to criminal suspects 
who committed crimes off reservations. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) 
(holding that unequal application of a criminal law to people in similar circumstances 
violated equal protection). 
107. See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1980) (" '[l]t defies rea-
son to suppose that Congress intended' such an exemption [of tribal Indians from a gen-
eral criminal law].") (quoting United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 
1979), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981). 
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tion, 108 conservation,1°9 and occupational safety. 110 Application 
to tribes of general criminal laws, in the absence of any detailed 
judicial discussion of their impact on tribal sovereignty, indi-
cates the ease with which courts conclude that Congress intends 
the overwhelming importance of uniform application of criminal 
laws to override that of tribal sovereignty. The reasonableness of 
this reading of congressional intent in the area of criminal law 
makes this the only area in which use of the Tuscarora rule is 
appropriate. 111 
2. The National Labor Relations Act- In Navajo Tribe u. 
NLRB, 112 the District of Columbia Circuit looked at the policy 
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),113 as courts have 
looked to the implicit policy of federal criminal law, to deter-
mine whether the statute authorized the Board to order a repre-
sentation election in a private reservation business employing 
Indian and non-Indian workers.114 In accordance with the Tus-
carora rule, the court held that the statute applied to such busi-
nesses.111> The court cited Tuscarora, 118 but based its holding on 
analysis of the policy of the NLRA, rather than on blind adher-
ence to the Tuscarora rule. The analysis comports with the 
spirit of the Tuscarora rule because it presumes that a court can 
find in a statute implicit congressional intent to abrogate tribal 
sovereignty. The court reasoned that the NLRA embodied a na-
tional labor policy that superseded any possible tribal right to 
108. See Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
928 (1961); see infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text. 
109. See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1004 (1980); see infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. 
110. Compare Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) 
with Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982); see supra 
notes 3-17 and accompanying text. 
111. In addition to the reasonableness of discerning congressional intent to apply 
criminal laws to tribes, limiting Tuscarora to criminal laws that fail to mention Indians 
has the added advantage of providing courts with a bright-line rule. 
112. 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961). 
113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). Section 151 states: 
Id. 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
114. 288 F.2d at 163. 
115. Id. at 165. 
116. Id. at 165 n.4. 
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control internal labor disputes.117 The decision was incorrect be-
cause the court took it upon itself to determine that Congress 
would give more weight to the policy of the NLRA than to that 
of supporting tribal sovereignty. 
Courts can easily determine that Congress would give more 
importance to the government's basic obligation to protect all 
citizens from crime than to prevent infringement of tribal sover-
eignty, but the balance Congress would strike between the eco-
nomic values of the NLRA and maintaining tribal autonomy is 
unclear. The values of worker organization and the uninter-
rupted flow of interstate commerce that the NLRA protects are 
important, but not as basic to society as the protection of all of 
its members from criminal harm. Hence, the court should not 
have presumed that Congress intended the NLRA to override 
aspects of tribal sovereignty. 
3. The Eagle Protection Act- In United States v. 
Fryberg118 the Ninth Circuit took it upon itself to determine 
which of two interests, tribal sovereignty or preservation of the 
national bird, Congress impliedly had intended to prevail. The 
court decided that the "broad purpose of the [Eagle Protection] 
Act to protect the bald eagle and prevent its extinction"119 
showed that Congress had intended the statute to apply to 
tribes. Reasoning that the Eagle Protection Act would be inef-
fective unless it applied to everyone, especially to Indians who 
have traditionally hunted eagles, the court decided that Con-
gress had intended the statute to cover reservations.120 
In relying on "national policy" to extend Tuscarora, the Ninth 
Circuit needlessly made itself an arbiter of whether a national 
conservation policy is sufficiently strong to override tribal sover-
117. Id. at 164. A bright-line rule favoring tribal sovereignty in such cases would 
eliminate such judicial guesswork. Although courts are ill-equipped to engage in this sort 
of policy balancing, it may be argued that they should adopt the contrary bright-line rule 
and assume that congressional silence about Indians indicates a willingness to abrogate 
tribal sovereignty. This argument rests on the view of the federal-Indian trust relation-
ship that finds Indian "best interests" more in protection than in sovereignty. On this 
view, application of the Act to Indian businesses would further the government's trust 
responsibility to protect its Indian wards. The federal-Indian trust relationship, properly 
viewed, however, defers to tribal sovereignty when it conflicts with an 0.rguable obligation 
to protect. Therefore, the best way for the government to fulfill its trust obligation to 
Indians is for Congress to consider carefully the effects of protective legislation on Indian 
sovereignty. Courts should abrogate such sovereignty only when Congress indicates that 
it has undertaken this inquiry by explicitly stating that a statute applies to tribes. 
118. 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). 
119. Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1982)). 
120. 622 F.2d at 1015-16. 
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eignty. A 1962 amendment to section 668a of the Eagle Protec-
tion Act121 explicitly refers to Indians, thus evincing congres-
sional intent that the statute apply to them. The amendment 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to permit the taking of 
eagles for "the religious purposes of Indian tribes. "122 Through 
the amendment, Congress clearly showed an intent to prohibit 
Indians from hunting eagles, except for religious purposes. 123 
Hence, Fryberg is decided correctly, but wrongly relies upon 
Tuscarora. 
The importance of sovereignty, as evident in the government's 
policy of protecting Indian autonomy12" and the judicial tradi-
tion of construing treaties to protect Indian rights of self-gov-
ernment,m dictate that courts should find congressional dimin-
ishment of tribal sovereignty only if a statute clearly states that 
it applies to tribes. The one exception to the preceding rule is 
criminal law. The fundamental obligation of government to pro-
tect its citizens from criminal harm creates the presumption that 
criminal statutes apply to everyone. Thus, courts can reasonably 
infer that general criminal statutes apply to reservation Indians. 
In areas other than criminal law, such as labor organization and 
wildlife conservation, it is unclear how Congress would weigh 
various policies against tribal sovereignty. Hence, except in in-
terpreting criminal laws, courts cannot reasonably follow the 
Tuscarora rule and decide that Congress intends general laws to 
apply to tribal Indians. 
B. The Merrion Rule: Inapplicability of General Federal 
Statutes to Tribes 
Dictum in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe126 gives addi-
tional support to the view that the Tuscarora rule is an incorrect 
121. Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1982)). 
122. Id. § 668a. 
123. But see United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974), in which the court 
stated: 
16 U.S.C. § 668 ... permit[s] the taking of eagles "for the religious purposes of 
Indian tribes .... " Theoretically non-Indians could be thus permitted by the 
Secretary to take the eagles, on or off reservations, as long as it was for the 
"religious purposes of Indian tribes." It is difficult to understand, then, how this 
exception could be interpreted to show an express intent of Congress to abrogate 
treaty rights of Indians to hunt on their own reservation. 
Id. at 458. 
124. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
126. 455 U.S. 130, 149, 152 (1982). 
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interpretation of Tuscarora's dictum. In Merrion, the Supreme 
Court suggested a rule of statutory construction more favorable 
to Indian sovereignty than the Tuscarora rule, 127 and consistent 
with the proper interpretation of the Tuscarora dictum.128 The 
Merrion rule is that general federal statutes do not apply to 
tribes unless they are explicitly mentioned. 129 
The holding of Merrion respects tribal autonomy by describ-
ing tribes as sovereigns130 capable of levying taxes to pay for the 
services they provide,131 and capable of controlling their terri-
tory by excluding outsiders.132 The dictum in Merrion suggests 
broader application of this principle of sovereignty, indicating 
that general statutes do not apply to Indians unless mentioned. 
The Court formulated the dictum in response to the argument 
of lessees,133 with long-term leases to extract oil and gas from 
the reservation, that Congress had implicitly removed the tribe's 
127. The dictum of Merrion that favors Indian sovereignty in the construction of 
general statutes is: 
We reiterate here our admonition in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 60 (1978): "a proper respect for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary 
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of 
clear indications of legislative intent." 
We find no "clear indications" that Congress has implicitly deprived the Tribe 
of its power to impose the severance tax. In any event, if there was ambiguity on 
this point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, for "[a]mbiguities in federal law 
have been construed generously in order to comport with ... traditional notions 
of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence." 
White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980). 
455 U.S. at 149-52. 
See also Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982), in 
which the court stated: 
Merrion, in our view, limits or, by implication, overrules Tuscarora ... at least 
to the extent of the broad language relied upon by the Secretary contained in 
Tuscarora that "it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a 
general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their prop-
erty interests." 
Id. at 713 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119 
(1960)). 
128. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
129. An early Supreme Court declaration of the principle that Congress abrogates 
Indian rights only if it does so expressly was in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). The 
Supreme Court stated, "Under the Constitution of the United States as originally estab-
lished . . . [g]eneral acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to 
clearly manifest an intention to include them." Id. at 99-100. In Federal Power Comm'n 
v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), though, the Court indicated that the rule 
of that case had superseded that of Elk. Id. at 116. 
130. 455 U.S. at 137-44. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 144-48. 
133. Id. at 149-52. 
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right to impose a severance tax134 through two statutes1311 and 
the national energy policy. 136 The Court showed its disapproval 
of the lessees' view that Congress could implicitly abrogate In-
dian sovereignty by stating, "[W]e reiterate here '[that a] proper 
respect for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority 
of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the ab-
sence of a clear indication of legislative intent.' "137 The Court 
deferred to Indian sovereignty by declaring that if it had been 
uncertain about whether Congress had implicitly removed the 
tribal power of taxation, 138 "the doubt would benefit the Tribe, 
for '[a]mbiguities in federal law have been construed generously 
in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of sovereignty 
and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal 
independence.' "139 
The Court's reliance on specific statutes and national policy to 
determine whether they implicitly overrode a tribe's right to tax 
fell short of deciding whether general federal statutes apply to 
tribes. The two statutes the Court interpreted were not general 
statutes, but specifically stated that they applied to Indian 
lands. 140 The Court's statutory interpretation, though, deferred 
to Indian sovereignty by refusing to infer, even from statutes 
that expressly applied some limits to Indian sovereignty, 141 that 
these same statutes also removed the sovereign tribal right of 
134. Id. 
135. The first statute the lessees claimed implicitly abrogated the tribal right to im-
pose a severance tax was the Act of May 11, 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1982), creat-
ing a regulatory scheme for leasing and developing Indian oil and gas reserves. The les-
sees claimed that Indian taxation of oil and gas production was inconsistent with the 
1938 Act's encouragement of oil and gas production on Indian land. Hence, the statute 
implicitly prohibited the taxes. The Court, however, reasoned that the 1938 Act did not 
prohibit severance taxes because the statute purported not to "restrict the right of tribes 
. . . to lease lands for mining purposes . . . in accordance with the provisions of any 
constitution and charter adopted by any Indian tribe .... " 25 U.S.C. § 396 (b) (1982). 
The second statute the lessees relied upon was the Act of Mar. 3, 1927, 25 U.S.C. §§ 
398a-398e (1982), that permitted state taxation of mineral leases on Executive Order 
reservations. The Court decided that the state taxation statute was consistent with In-
dian taxation because different sovereigns can tax the same transactions. 455 U.S. at 
150-51. . 
136. The lessees claimed that tribal taxation was inconsistent with the national pol-
icy of encouraging development of oil and gas production. The Court rejected the na-
tional policy argument because it did not explain why national energy policy would allow 
states, but not tribes, to tax the severance of oil and gas. 455 U.S. at 151-52. 
137. Id. at 149 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)). 
138. The Supreme Court found no indication that Congress had not removed the 
tribe's power to impose a severance tax. 455 U.S. at 152. 
139. Id. (quoting White Mt. Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)). 
140. See supra note 135. 
141. Id. 
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taxation. 142 The Court indicated that a statute would abolish 
that right only by specifically declaring that it was doing so. By 
stating that in the statutes and national policy it found "no 
'clear indications' that Congress had implicitly deprived the 
Tribe of its power to impose the severance tax,"143 the Court 
suggested that Congress must act explicitly when the effect of its 
action is to diminish tribal sovereignty. 
While Merrion does not address directly the applicability to 
tribes of general statutes, its dictum demonstrates the Court's 
preference for Indian sovereignty in the face of statutes that fail 
to abrogate expressly that sovereignty.144 Merrion thereby pro-
vides a rule of statutory construction consistent with the proper 
interpretation of the Tuscarora dictum, 1411 the judiciary's inter-
pretation of treaties to protect tribal self-government, 146 and the 
government's current policy of Indian self-determination.147 
C. Applying the Merrion Rule: Nonapplicability of the Act 
to Indian Businesses on Reservations 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act is a general statute 
that does not expressly refer to Indian-owned businesses on res-
ervations. It states that its purpose is "to assure so far as possi-
ble every man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions and to preserve our human resources. "148 
The legislative history, like the face of the Act, speaks in broad 
terms of the need to protect all workers.149 Similarly, the statute 
defines "person," in its definition of employer, as "one or more 
individuals, 160 partnerships, associations, corporations, business 
142. 455 U.S. at 152. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 149-52. 
145. See supra notes 96-98. 
146. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
147. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
148. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). 
149. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16 (1970). The Report 
states: "Clearly, the life of a worker in one state is as important as a worker's life in 
another state, and uniform standards must be required to protect all workers from dan-
gerous substances." Id. at 15. 
150. If an individual Indian owned a business on a reservation the Act would not 
necessarily apply to it. The cases holding that general statutes apply to individual Indi-
ans usually refer to Indians living apart from their tribes, and therefore not subject to 
tribal jurisdiction. See, e.g., supra note 97 and accompanying text. Application of the Act 
to individual Indians' businesses on reservations would be just as great an infringement 
on tribal sovereignty as application of the Act to tribal businesses. In either case, tribes 
would lose the power to pass their own occupational health and safety laws, and to ex-
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trusts, legal representatives, or any organized group of per-
sons."1111 Yet nowhere in the Act is there any reference to Indi-
ans, tribes, or reservations. Thus, the applicability to Indian 
businesses of the Act turns on the proper construction of such a 
general statute. 
No Supreme Court case has yet squarely decided the question 
of the applicability to Indian reservations of such a general stat-
ute.1112 Faced with such a question, a court must look for guid-
ance to either the Tuscarora or Merrion rule. Although applying 
the Tuscarora rule to the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
might be seen as consistent with the government's trust respon-
sibility to protect Indians, 1113 the rule's scope is properly limited 
to the area of federal criminal law. 1114 Because the Act is not a 
criminal statute, the Merrion rule-consistent with the proper 
interpretation of the Tuscarora dictum, m with the judiciary's 
interpretation of treaties to protect tribal self-government, m 
with the government's current policy of Indian self-determina-
tion, 1117 and with the government's trust obligation to protect In-
dian sovereignty1118-must control. Supreme Court precedent, 
expressing as it does an overriding preference for tribal sover-
eignty, 1119 compels the conclusion that federal courts should ap-
ply the Merrion rule whenever sovereignty is in issue. Under this 
rule, courts should refuse to apply the Act to Indian-owned busi-
nesses on reservations because the Act fails to express its appli-
cability to Indians. Properly interpreted, the Tuscarora rule 
does not suggest a different result. 160 
III. AMENDING THE AcT To APPLY To INDIAN BusINESsEs oN 
RESERVATIONS 
Because the Act does not apply to Indian businesses, the only 
safety protection Indian workers receive is that which their tri-
elude federal inspectors. 
151. 29 U.S.C. § 652(4) (1982); see supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
152. The Tuscarora and Merrion rules are both based on dicta. See supra notes 89, 
127, and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 101-25 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
158 .• See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra notes 96-98, 126-47 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
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bal governments or employment supervisors choose to give 
them. As such protection may prove inadequate, Congress 
should amend the Act so that it applies to Indian businesses. 
Because of the importance of tribal sovereignty, however, 
amendment must be delicately crafted to protect Indian workers 
without unnecessarily impinging on tribal autonomy. Before 
amendment of the Act, therefore, Congress should conduct hear-
ings to give the tribes, as sovereigns, an opportunity to suggest 
how they think the Act should apply to them. In particular, 
Congress and the Indians need to explore the possibility of tribal 
administration of the Act to Indian businesses. Congress and the 
Indians also need to formulate a plan whereby the government 
will help pay financially troubled Indian businesses' costs of 
complying with the Act, so that the Act will not bankrupt such 
businesses. 
A. Inadequate Protection of Employees of Indian Businesses 
In the absence of the Act's jurisdiction over reservation busi-
nesses owned by individual Indians or tribes, Indian workers 
may receive workplace protection formally through tribal laws, 
or informally through concerned individual managers. Indian 
tribes have the sovereign power to enact their own health and 
safety laws161 governing reservation businesses. Alternatively, 
tribes can voluntarily adopt the Act's standards. The latter leg-
islative action is preferable because the federal government's ex-
pertise in formulating worker health and safety standards will be 
likely to produce fair, efficient, and manageable protective regu-
lations. Two problems, however, exist with either legislative 
scheme. First, some tribes may never adopt occupational health 
and safety standards. Indian businesses are often tribally owned, 
and a tribe that values profits more than safety might not pass 
safety laws.162 A related problem of tribal legislation is that even 
161. See, e.g, F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 248; Scott, Controlling Land Use on the 
Checkerboard: The Zoning Powers of Indian Tribes After Montana v. United States, 10 
AM. IND. L. REV. 187 (1984) ("[E]nvironmental legislation enacted by Indian tribes in-
clude wildlife conservation codes and health and safety sanitation ordinances."). 
162. Indians who profit from reservation businesses may be more interested in avoid-
ing the cost of compliance with the Act than protecting fellow Indians. In Castaneda v, 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that members of a mi-
nority do not necessarily protect the best interests of other people of the same minority. 
The Court found intentional discrimination against Mexican-Americans in grand jury 
selection, in a county in which three of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-
Americans. 
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tribes that pass safety laws might decide from time to time to 
protect their profits by laxly enforcing safety regulations. 
Managers' concerns for worker safety may be a complement to 
or an alternative for tribal legislation as a means of protecting 
workers. Managers can ask for safety information from a variety 
of sources such as the companies that insure their businesses 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Man-
agers, however, cannot provide comprehensive protection for 
their workers because they do not always have the expertise to 
know that certain situations are hazardous. Additionally, manag-
ers, like tribal governments, may be more interested in protect-
ing profits than safety. Further protection seems desirable be-
cause neither tribal legislation nor supervisory benevolence 
necessarily will produce adequate safety regulation. 163 
B. The Need to Protect Workers and the Government's 
Trust Responsibility to Indians 
The concern for workers that the Act represents, and the gov-
ernment's trust duty to protect Indians, mandate that Congress 
amend the Act to include Indian businesses.164 Such an amend-
ment should recognize the government's duty to respect tribal 
sovereignty,m as well as to protect individual Indians, by giving 
tribes an opportunity to express their views on the form of the 
163. Congress's plenary authority over Indians unquestionably gives it the power to 
amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act so that it applies to Indian businesses on 
reservations. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. Such an amendment surely 
would infringe upon sovereignty by removing tribes' power to impose their own occupa-
tional safety laws, and to exclude federal inspectors from their land. Yet it would also 
provide Indian workers with needed workplace protection. Congress need not always 
leave Indian tribes completely alone, out of deference to sovereignty; rather, sovereignty 
is too important a value for courts to allow to wither from mere congressional inatten-
tion. What is needed is a judicial rule that forces Congress to consider the deleterious 
effects on sovereignty of otherwise beneficial legislation. Once it has undertaken such 
analysis, Congress will often determine, as it should in the case of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, that some form of the legislation should apply to tribes. In this 
regard, Congress should attend to Indian views of a proposed statute in determining 
whether it may be amended to protect Indians in ways that will have only minimal ad-
verse impact on sovereignty. See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text. 
164. An admitted disadvantage of applying the Act to reservation businesses is that 
Indians "are undoubtedly the most highly regulated group in our society." Wilkinson & 
Volkman, supra note 39, at 614-15 n.66. See F. COHEN, supra note 16, at vii ("The fed-
eral Congress . . . has enacted over four thousand treaties and statutes dealing with Na-
tive Americans. Regulations and guidelines implementing these laws are even more nu-
merous. The tribes' own laws, and some state statutes dealing with Indians, add to the 
complexity."). 
165. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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amendment and by considering tribal administration of the Act 
on reservations. 
Congressional passage of the Act created a national policy of 
assuring safe and healthful conditions for all workers.166 The Act 
was a response to the problem of work-related accidents and 
deaths. In hearings about the Act, the Senate Committee on La-
bor and Human Affairs noted that "14,500 persons are killed an-
nually as a result of industrial accidents . . . . By the lowest 
count 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each year, re-
sulting in the loss of 250 million man days of work-many more 
than are lost through strikes. "167 Congress should amend the Act 
so that tribal workers are not denied the protection other Ameri-
can workers receive. 
Apart from the importance of the Act's purpose, Indians de-
serve the Act's safeguards because of the United States's trust 
responsibility to protect Indians.168 In the twentieth century, the 
government has manifested recognition of .its trust responsibility 
by providing social programs for Indians.169 Indians have bene-
fited from general federal programs to aid the poor and minori-
ties, 170 as well as from special programs for Indians such as those 
of "[t]he Departments of Health and Human Services, Educa-
tion, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Commerce, and 
Justice and agencies such as the federal Legal Services Corpora-
tion."171 Examples include programs for Indians in education,172 
166. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
167. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 5177, 5178. 
168. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. While this trust obligation must 
yield to that of supporting tribal sovereignty, Congress can protect individual Indians 
and promote tribal sovereignty by carefully weighing the benefits of proposed protective 
legislation against its toll on tribal sovereignty before deciding whether to pass it. When 
Congress decides that protective legislation is necessary for Indians, it should respect 
sovereignty by consulting with the tribes in formulating such legislation. See infra notes 
175-82 and accompanying text. 
169. Indians do not appear to have strongly objected to these programs on the 
ground that they have removed the tribes' sovereign power to care for their own people. 
The Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n 
(1982), gives some tribes some control over social programs by allowing them to adminis-
ter many federal programs for their people. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
Today, Indians are trying to decrease or eliminate their reliance on federal programs. 
Richard Hayward, the tribal chairman of the Mashantucket Pequots, explains his tribe's 
desire to achieve self-sufficiency, a hope of many tribes, by stating, "There are grand 
opportunities coming up. We hope not to be on any government payrolls, to be able to 
pay our own way. I see it happening." N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1983, at 2, col. 1. 
170. F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 674. 
171. Id. 
172. The Indian Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 24laa-24lff, 1211a, 1221f-122lh, 
3385-3385b (1982), provides grants to improve educational opportunities for Indians. 
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housing,173 and health. 174 Congressional extension of the Act's 
coverage would be consistent with the government's policy of 
providing programs to aid Indians, and with the Act's objective 
of protecting the nation's workers. 
C. Indian Participation in Determining Administration 
Congress should extend the Act's coverage to Indian busi-
nesses by amending it so that it explicitly states that it covers 
businesses on reservations. Before the amendment, however, 
Congress should conduct hearings to give Indians an opportu-
nity to explain how they think the Act should apply to them. m 
Such hearings would recognize that tribes, as sovereigns, have a 
right to express their opinions about inspections on their land, 
and about health and safety laws that will affect their people. 176 
Able to closely observe the health and safety problems of their 
people, tribal representatives will be likely to give Congress 
unique insight into the safety needs of Indian workers. 
A major issue for Indians to discuss with Congress is whether 
the tribes could administer the Act to Indian businesses. In re-
cent years, tribes have accepted an increasing amount of respon-
sibility for performing the federal government's tasks on reser-
173. The Housing Improvement Program, administered by the Bureau of Indian Af. 
fairs under 25 C.F.R. §§ 256.1-.10 (1984), provides grants for building repairs to Indians 
living on or off reservations, regardless of eligibility for assistance under other federal 
housing programs. 
174. Congress expressed its concern for Indians' medical needs in the Indian Health 
Care Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1680 (1982). The Health Care Act s.tates: 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation, in fulfillment 
of its special responsibilities and legal obligations to the American Indian peo-
ple, to meet the national goal of providing the highest possible health status to 
Indians and to provide existing Indian health services with all the resources nec-
essary to effect that policy. 
Id.§ 1602. 
175. Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination: Some 
Problems and Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 AR1z. L. REV. 286 (1977), states: 
[T]he only way Congress can effectively prevent the unintended extension of 
federal power over Indian country is to incorporate an awareness of Indian 
desires and aspirations into the legislative process on any bill that might affect 
Indian interests. Congress would then be in a position to acknowledge and deal 
with those interests explicitly. In doing so, the legislature should call for input 
from the Indian people to be affected and, to the maximum degree possible, be 
guided by that input. 
Id. at 312. 
176. Congressional hearings about tribes' views of extension of the Act to them would 
be consistent with the government's current policy of recognizing and fostering Indian 
autonomy. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
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vations. For example, the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977,177 which imposes federal reclamation 
standards for mining on Indian land, directs the Secretary of the 
Interior to work with Indians to determine how they can admin-
ister the statute on their lands.178 The Indian Self-Determina-
tion and Educational Assistance Act179 declares Congress's com-
mitment to "the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-
determination policy which will permit an orderly transition 
from federal domination of programs for and services to Indians 
to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in 
the planning, conduct, and administration of thes~ programs 
and services."180 Indian administration of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act on reservations would be consistent with 
the Act's policy of decentralization by allowing states to admin-
ister health and safety programs.181 Tribes could inspect busi-
nesses owned by individual Indians,182 but effective administra-
tion of the Act with respect to tribally-owned enterprises would 
be impossible because of the conflict of interest between tribal 
enforcement of the statute and tribal ownership of businesses. 
D. Government Subsidization of Compliance 
Congress and the Indian tribes need to decide how financially 
troubled Indian businesses would pay for the cost of complying 
with the Act's regulations. Two different sections of the Act im-
plicitly set guidelines for the permissible cost of the Act's stan-
dards. Section 652(8) defines an "occupational safety and health 
standard" as "a standard which requires conditions ... reason-
ably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and ·places of employment."183 The use of "reasona-
bly" in section 652(8) suggests that before implementation of 
standards, the Secretary should consider the standards' costs 
177. 30 u.s.c. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). 
178. Id. § 1300. 
179. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982). 
180. Id. § 450a(b). 
181. 29 u.s.c. § 667 (1982). 
182. Many individual Indians own businesses on reservations, and Indian leaders are 
encouraging more Indians to acquire their own enterprises. Indians prefer individual In-
dian ownership to joint ventures with private companies because Native American entre-
preneurs are more sensitive to their culture than non-Indian companies. Telephone in-
terview with Jacob Coin, Director of Business/Socio-Economic Development Strategy 
(SEDS) for the Council for Tribal Employment Rights (Mar. 1985). 
183. 29 u.s.c. § 652(8) (1982). 
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and benefits to businesses and society. Section 655(b)(5), how-
ever, suggests that standards for toxic substances may be valid, 
regardless of their costs.184 Whatever the standards of "reasona-
ble" safety, some of the regulations may be too expensive for 
tribal businesses to meet. Some Indian businesses are not cur-
rently profitable. m For other reasons related to the social condi-
tions of Indians on reservations, even unprofitable Indian busi-
nesses may need to be encouraged to survive. Bankruptcy of 
tribal businesses that could not afford compliance costs would 
aggravate reservation unemployment, already unusually high. 188 
The Reagan Administration's cuts in general welfare programs, 
as well as those targeted for Indians, 187 have increased the need 
for Indian businesses. Tribal businesses not only aid Indians fi-
nancially, but also further the maintenance of Indian culture by 
allowing Indians to remain together on reservations. 188 
The importance of Indian businesses dictates that financially 
troubled tribal enterprises should not have to bear the cost of 
compliance with the Act. To ensure the survival of Indian busi-
nesses, the government should give loans189 or grants to Indian 
184. See American Textile Mfrs.' Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (holding that 
the Secretary of Labor does not have to do a cost-benefit analysis before promulgating 
worker safeguards for toxic substances). 
185. One reason some Indian businesses have financial problems is that profits are 
not their only goal. In Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 1983-1984 O.S.H. Dec. 
(CCH) 'II 26,732, rev'd, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985), the Occupational Safety and Health 
Commission described the goals of the Farm as to improve "the economic and social 
conditions of the people of the reservations, with the profit motive being secondary to 
these purposes.'' Id. at 34,168. 
186. See, e.g, F. COHEN, supra note 16, at 718; Profile, TERO, vol. 1, no. 2, at 6 (Coun-
cil for Tribal Employment Rights 1984) ("The 2.8 million acre [Wind River] reservation 
has about 7000 Indian people. Smith [ director of Wind River's Tribal Energy Rights 
Organization] says that the unemployment r~te is 64 % , which is mild, he adds, com-
pared to some reservations with unemployment in the eighty and ninety percentiles 
[sic].'') (on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
187. See Redhorse & Smith, American Indian Tribal Taxation of Energy Resources, 
22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 659, 659 (1982). 
188. Clinton, supra note 38, at 979, states: 
[F]or the reservation policy to remain a viable option for the tribal Indian, tri-
bally leased economic development of Indian reservations is essential. Only the 
development of economic opportunities within the structure of the tribal society 
will continue to preserve Indian control and Indian culture within the land base 
allocated for such purposes. 
See also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
189. If the government decided to help Indian businesses through a loan program, it 
could use § 636(b)(3) of the Small Business Budget Reconciliation and Loan Consolida-
tion/Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 632, 633, 636, 636a, 639, 696 (1982), provided that 
businesses met all of the statute's requirements. Section 636(b)(3) states that the govern-
ment can make loans as the Small Business Administration 
may determine to be necessary or appropriate to assist any small business con-
cern in effecting additions to, alterations in, or reinstatements in the same or a 
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businesses that cannot afford to pay their compliance costs. 
Government payment of Indians' compliance costs, through ei-
ther a loan or grant program, would be consistent with the gov-
ernment's policy of providing economic assistance to Indian 
businesses. The federal government currently gives economic 
aid, such as revolving loan funds, 190 to tribal enterprises. Indian 
businesses, though, should pay their own costs if they can afford 
them, thereby allowing Indians to move closer to self-sufficiency. 
CONCLUSION 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act is a general statute 
that does not apply to Indian businesses on reservations because 
it does not specifically mention them. Such an interpretation of 
the Act is consistent with the government's current policy of fos-
tering Indian self-determination, the government's duty to pro-
mote tribal autonomy, and judicial deference for Indian sover-
eignty in treaty construction. 
Congress should amend the Act in a manner that fulfills the 
government's obligations to protect both tribal independence 
and individual Indians. Thus, Congress should amend the Act to 
explicitly extend its protection to workers on Indian reserva-
tions, while respecting Indian sovereignty by giving Indians an 
opportunity to decide how the Act will apply to them. 
-Maureen M. Crough 
new location of its plant, facilities, or methods of operation made necessary by 
direct attention of the federal government or as a consequence of federal govern-
ment action to meet requirements imposed on such concern under any federal 
law .... 
190. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1461-1469 (1982). 
